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Abstract 
During the last few years, a lot of research has been done to create voting protocols and election 
systems that facilitate voting via private computer networks, the Internet or remote mobile 
terminals. The interest in e-voting on one hand is founded in problems such as violence, 
intimidation, ballot stuffing, underage and multiple voting, complicity of security agencies, 
absence or late arrival of election materials etc which often characterise conventional voting 
systems. On the other hand, it is based upon interest and attention devoted to e-government, e-
democracy, e-governance, etc.  
In this paper, a critical appraisal of e-voting variants; the benefits and risks associated with the 
various electronic voting methods and electronic voting systems were presented and exhaustively 
discussed. 
Keywords: E-voting, Democracy, Election, Ballot, Punched card system, Optical scan voting 
system, Direct recording electronic systems and Remote e-voting. 
1. Introduction 
“While democracy must be more than elections, it is also true it cannot be less” former Secretary 
General Kofi Annan once said (Annan, 2000). Democracy is a government by the people 
exercised either directly or through elected representative. Election on the other hand, is a 
process in which voters choose their representatives and express their preferences for the way 
that they will be governed (Kohno et al., 2003) and (Malkawi et al., 2009). Naturally, the 
integrity of the election process is fundamental to the integrity of democracy itself.  
Democracy and elections have more than 2500 years of tradition. However, technology has 
always influenced and shaped the ways elections are held (Held, 2006). In times past, different 
voting systems that are based on traditional paper ballots and mechanical devices were 
developed for elections (Malkawi et al., 2009). In traditional paper ballots, voters choose or mark 
their favourite choices on ballots and place them in boxes, which are sealed and officially opened 
under special conditions to warrant transparency. The ballots are then counted manually, which 
is a tedious process that is subject to human error. With voting via mechanical systems, voters 
make their choices by pulling down on mechanical levers that correspond to their favourite 
choice of candidates. Each lever has a mechanical counter that reports the number of votes for 
that position. These machines are no longer manufactured (NSF, 2001). 
In Africa, most elections are conducted using paper ballots. However, there have been countless 
reported cases of eligible voters being unable or prevented from exercising their right to vote as 
stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, sometimes due to 
violence, intimidation, ballot stuffing, under-age and multiple voting, counting error, complicity 
of the security agencies and the absence or late arrival of election materials etc (Boniface, 2008).  
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Recent elections worldwide have seen a gradual decline in the overall percentage of the 
electorate exercising their right to vote (Qadah, 2005). This is worrying from a democratic point 
of view in that, if the reasons of the decline are left unchecked, the mandate of those elected to 
hold the positions might eventually be questionable (Qadah, 2005). Moreover, it is interesting to 
note here that traditional/manual voting systems are slow, complex, inaccurate and inefficient. 
To counter these drawbacks, Governments have proposed a number of possible methods for re-
engaging the electorate in the voting process. One of these methods is the modernization of the 
way in which the elections are being conducted. These methods include the use of electronic 
voting (e-voting) as a new and modernized way to carry out the election process (Qadah, 2005).  
The term e-voting is being used from casting the vote by electronic means to asking the internet 
community for an opinion on a political issue, as well as from tabulating the votes by electronic 
means to integrated electronic systems from voters’ and candidates’ registration to the 
publication of election results (Buchsbaum, 2004). The term is used, in variety of different ways 
mainly and it encompasses all voting techniques involving electronic voting equipment, 
including voting over the internet, using booths in polling stations and sometimes even counting 
of paper ballots (Magi, 2007). 
In addition to overcoming commonly encountered election pitfalls, electoral vote counts are done 
in real time that by the end of elections day, the results are automatically out (Mercuri, 2000) and 
(Rubin, 2002). The election process can be easily enhanced with various features based on the 
demand and requirements of different countries around the world. E-voting is an 
interdisciplinary subject and should be studied together with the experts of different domains, 
such as software engineering, cryptography, politics, law, economics and social sciences. 
Although many people have worked on this subject, mostly e-voting is known as a challenging 
topic in cryptography because of the need to achieve voter anonymity, and therefore, to ensure 
his/her privacy (Cetinkaya and Cetinkaya, 2007). 
2. Electronic voting 
E-voting is any voting method whereby at least the voter’s intention is expressed or collected by 
electronic means (Magi, 2007). It is a term encompassing several different types of voting, 
embracing both electronic means of casting a vote and electronic means of counting votes. In 
general, two main types of e-voting can be identified (Buchsbaum, 2004):   
a) E-voting supervised by the physical presence of representatives of governmental or 
independent electoral authorities. This may include the following voting technologies: 
(i) Document based ballot voting systems (punched cards and  optical scan voting 
systems)  
(ii) Direct-recording electronic voting systems (DREs). 
This is usually referred to as kiosk voting. 
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b) E-voting within the voter’s sole influence, not physically supervised by representatives of 
governmental authorities, e.g. voting from one’s own or another person’s computer via the 
internet, by mobile phones (including Short Message Service, SMS), or via digital 
television (Buchsbaum, 2004). This is usually referred to as remote e-voting.  
2.1 Kiosk voting 
Kiosk voting in most cases involves the use of dedicated voting machines in polling stations or 
other controlled locations (Magi, 2007). Voters mark their choice electronically (perhaps on 
touch sensitive screen) rather than on paper ballot. The votes are counted on individual 
machines, known as Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machines, and the votes cast are 
transferred to the central tallying point by unspecified means. A ballot paper can be printed and 
retained in confidence in a ballot box as an additional check. Variants of kiosk voting include the 
following: 
2.1.1 Document based ballot voting systems 
Document based ballot voting system includes the following technologies: 
a) Punched card system: Punched card systems employ a card (or cards) and a small 
clipboard-sized device for recording votes (Jones, 2001). Voters punch holes in the cards 
(with a supplied punch device) opposite their candidate or ballot issue choice. After voting, 
the voter may place the ballot in a ballot box, or the ballot may be fed into a computer vote 
tabulating device at the precinct (ward). The idea of voting by punching holes on paper or 
cards originated in the 1890s and inventors continued to explore this in the years that 
followed. The first major success for punched-card voting came in 1965, with Joseph P. 
Harris ‘development of the Votomatic punched-card system. This was based on IBM’s Port-
A-Punch technology (Jones, 2001).  
b) Optical scan voting system: An optical scan voting system is an electronic voting system 
that uses an optical scanner to read marked paper ballots and tally the results. Types of 
optical scan systems include (Jones, 2001): 
i. Marksense systems: One technology used is the optical mark recognition scanners 
where voters mark their choice in a voting response location, usually filling a rectangle, 
circle or oval, or by completing an arrow. Various mark-sense voting systems have used a 
variety of different approaches to determining what marks are counted as votes.  
Early systems, such as the Votronic, introduced in 1965, had a single photo-sensor per 
column of marks on the ballot. Most such tabulators used analog comparators that 
counted all marks darker than a fixed threshold as being votes. The use of digital imaging 
technology to view the ballot does not necessarily imply more sophisticated mark 
recognition. The ballot can be immediately tabulated at polling stations allowing for 
voters to be notified by the voting system of voting errors such as an over-vote and can 
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prevent residual votes. One such method can display a digital image of the ballot being 
submitted and allows the voter to review how their ballots are being read. This is known 
as a precinct count voting system. Alternately the ballots can be collected in the polling 
station and tabulated later at a central facility, known as central count voting system 
(Jones, 2001). 
 
ii. Electronic ballot marker: An electronic ballot marker (EBM) or ballot marking device 
(BMD) is an electronic device that can aid a disabled voter in marking a paper ballot. 
This device can allow for audio interfaces and still provide paper ballots (Jones, 2001). 
 
iii. Digital pen voting systems: Digital pen voting systems use ballots on digital paper 
which is recognized by a small camera in the pen while it is marked by the voter. The 
ballots are collected in a ballot box and the digital pen is returned to an election official 
for tabulation. This technology was expected to be used in the 2008 Hamburg state 
elections, but eventually was decided against due to controversy surrounding the 
accuracy of voting tallies. The technology was first used in Scotland in 2006 for a local 
community council election (Jones, 2001). 
2.1.2 Direct recording electronic systems 
DREs (direct recording electronic systems) are the first completely computerized voting systems. 
They were introduced in the 1970s. DREs are somewhat analogous to (although more 
sophisticated than) lever machines. The voter chooses candidates from a posted ballot. 
Depending on the equipment used, the ballot may be printed and posted on the DREs, as it is 
with a lever machine, or it may be displayed on a computer screen. Voters make their choices by 
pushing buttons, touching the screen, or using other devices. The voter submits the choices made 
before leaving the booth, for example by pushing a “vote” button and the votes are then recorded 
electronically (Fischer, 2003). There is considerable variability in the design of DREs, but they 
can be classified into three basic types. The oldest design essentially mimics the interface of a 
lever machine. The entire posted ballot is visible at once. Instead of moving levers to make 
choices, the voter pushes a button next to a candidate’s name, or pushes on the name itself, 
triggering an underlying electronic micro-switch and turning on a small light next to the choice. 
With the second type, a ballot page is displayed on a computer screen, and the voter uses 
mechanical devices such as arrow keys and buttons to make choices on a page and to change 
ballot pages. The third type is similar to the second except that it has a touch-screen display, 
where the voter makes a choice by touching the name of the candidate on the computer screen 
and casts the ballot by pressing a separate button after all choices have been made. In all kinds of 
DREs, when a ballot is cast, the votes are directly stored in a computer memory device such as a 
removable memory card or non-volatile memory circuit (Fischer, 2003).  
As with lever machines, there is no document ballot, although with a DREs each cast ballot may 
also be separately recorded. Touch-screen and other DREs using computer-style displays are 
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arguably the most versatile and user-friendly of any current voting system. Each machine can 
easily be programmed to display ballots in different languages and for different offices, 
depending on voters’ needs. It can also be programmed to display a voter’s ballot choices on a 
single page for review before casting the vote. It can be made fully accessible for persons with 
disabilities, including visual impairment. Like lever machines, it can prevent over votes and 
ambiguous choices or spoilage of the ballot from extraneous marks, since there is no document 
ballot; but it can also notify voters of under-votes. No other kind of voting system possesses all 
of these features (Fischer, 2003). 
2.1.3 Public network DRE voting system 
A public network DRE voting system is an election system that uses electronic ballots and 
transmits vote data from the polling place to another location over a public network. Vote data 
may be transmitted as individual ballots as they are cast, periodically as batches of ballots 
throughout the Election Day, or as one batch at the close of voting (Fischer, 2003). This includes 
Internet voting as well as telephone voting. Public network DRE voting system can utilize either 
precinct count or central count method. The central count method tabulates ballots from multiple 
precincts at a central location (Fischer, 2003). 
2.2 Remote e-voting 
The advancement of information and telecommunications technologies allow for a fully 
automated, online computerized election process (Malkawi et al., 2009). This type of election 
process is referred to as remote electronic voting (e-voting). Remote electronic voting is the 
preferred term for voting that takes place by electronic means from any location (Magi, 2007). 
This could include the use of the Internet, text message, interactive digital TV or touch tone 
telephone. Internet voting (i-voting) is a specific case of remote electronic voting, whereby the 
vote takes place over the Internet such as via a web site or voting applet. Sometimes also used 
synonymously with remote electronic voting. Remote e-voting links the possibility of quick and 
reliable counting to that of voting outside of polling stations and traditional polling times as well 
as to the possibility of voting from abroad irrespective of locations of diplomatic and consular 
missions as well as unreliable postal services (Buchsbaum, 2004). 
3. Benefits of e-voting 
A number of countries, worldwide, has started or considered starting, thinking and 
experimenting as well as implementing e-voting (Goodman, 2010). In Europe, a variety of e-
voting schemes is developed, tested and piloted across the continent. Outside of Europe, e-voting 
at poll sites is practiced in some states of the USA and Brazil progressively followed by Mexico 
and considered by other Central and Latin American countries, in some countries of the former 
Soviet Union and in India (Goodman, 2010). The reasons for the growing interest in e-voting 
may not be identical in all cases but the following reasons are identified (Buchsbaum, 2004).  
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i. Enabling voters to cast their vote from a place other than the poll site in their voting 
district. 
ii. Facilitating the casting of the vote by the voter. 
iii. Facilitating the participation in elections and referendums of all those who are entitled to 
vote, and particularly of citizens residing or staying abroad; 
iv. Widening access to the voting process for voters with disabilities or those having other 
difficulties in being physically present at a poll site and using the devices available there. 
v. Increasing voter turnout by providing additional voting channels. 
vi. Bringing voting in line with new developments in society and the increasing use of new 
technologies as a medium for communication and civic engagement in pursuit of 
democracy. 
vii. Reducing, over time, the overall cost to the electoral authorities of conducting an election 
or referendum. 
viii. Delivering voting results reliably and more quickly and 
ix. Providing the electorate with a better service in pursuit of democracy, by offering a 
variety of voting channels. 
4. Risks of e-voting 
Those opposed to, or skeptical of, electronic voting point to several drawbacks and perceived 
risks that are associated with the underlying technologies of this voting system. The most 
prominently cited risk relates to security (Goodman, 2010). Threats of computer viruses or 
hacker-orchestrated ‘denial of service’ attacks are most commonly mentioned as problems that 
could compromise an election and public confidence in electronic voting. This concern is most 
prevalent with regard to the security of personal computers. In the light of this, the maintenance 
of ballot secrecy is presented as an issue when using computers that are unprotected, located in 
public places, or which may be susceptible to virus attacks. Other potential technical problems or 
issues include power outages or malfunctions in Internet connectivity as well as the possibility of 
servers shutting down or crashing. The reliable recording and storage of votes is also an 
important consideration (Goodman, 2010).  
Secondly, problems with access are raised. There is a digital divide between those who have 
home computers with Internet connections and those who do not. Also, there may be a digital 
divide between those who have faster access and those who have slower connections and hence 
lower quality access. People with higher incomes are more likely to be able to afford access. 
Furthermore, access is often less expensive and of higher quality in urban areas. Those with 
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lower incomes and who live in rural areas are at a disadvantage. Therefore, the extension of 
remote e-voting has the potential to create divides with respect to many socio-economic 
variables, namely income, education, gender, geography and race and ethnicity. These potential 
divides could be problematic for participation and representation (Goodman, 2010). 
Thirdly, it is said that remote e-voting present greater opportunity for fraud and coercion or vote-
buying. Fraud occurs when someone votes on another’s behalf without their permission, whereas 
coercion or vote-buying takes place when a voter is pressured by others to vote in a way that he 
or she would not have otherwise (Goodman, 2010). Both present problems for ballot integrity 
since it is important that every vote cast be tallied as the voter intended. There is additional 
opportunity for fraud in electronic voting systems if voter notification cards, which contain 
unique passwords required to cast a ballot, are intercepted. In the case of ballots not cast in 
person it is more challenging to verify a voter’s identity. Remote voter authentication can be a 
problem since it may be difficult to confirm that the person voting is actually who he or she 
claims to be. While digital signatures and passwords can help, they are not foolproof and could 
potentially be shared.  
The issue of voter education is cited as a concern. A lot of time and money must be invested to 
ensure that the public is aware that electronic voting is an option and that voters are able to 
understand and use the on-line system to cast a ballot. Without correct marketing and 
advertising, it will be difficult to engage electors (Goodman, 2010). 
Privatization is a concern when electoral administrators cede control to a hired firm. Contracting 
elections out to private companies to run the electronic operations has negative implications for 
some people, and hence has the potential to negatively impact public confidence and trust in 
government and elections (Goodman, 2010) and (Putnam, 2000). 
Besides the aforementioned limitations, there is a dire need for international standards to govern 
the technology, the software reliability and accuracy, the processes and algorithms deployed 
within the technology, and the verification of all hardware, software and protocols involved. 
Such standards will eventually allow elections to proceed in any part of the world without the 
need for monitoring bodies (Malkawi et al., 2009) 
5. Conclusion 
Elections allow the populace to choose their representatives and express their preferences for 
how they will be governed. Naturally, the integrity of the election process is fundamental to the 
integrity of democracy itself. The election system must be sufficiently robust to withstand a 
variety of fraudulent behaviors and must be sufficiently transparent and comprehensible that 
voters and candidates can accept the results of an election. However, this cannot be said for 
conventional voting systems. Unsurprisingly, history is littered with examples of elections being 
manipulated in order to influence their outcome. Allegations of violence, intimidation, ballot 
stuffing, under-age and multiple voting, counting error, complicity of the security agencies and 
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the absence or late arrival of election materials etc often trail elections conducted using these 
systems of voting. 
Electronic voting is emerging as significant alternative to these conventional systems in the 
delivery of reliable and trusted elections. The emergence of e-voting will undoubtedly enabled 
voters to cast their vote from a place other than the poll site in their voting district, facilitate the 
casting of the vote by the voter, facilitate more participation in elections by those who are 
entitled to vote,  widen access to the voting process for voters with disabilities or those having 
other difficulties in being physically present at a poll site,  increased voters turnout by providing 
additional voting channels, reduced overall cost to the electoral authorities of conducting an 
election, deliver voting results reliably and more quickly amongst many other benefits. 
However, technological threats to the security of an electronic voting system still constitute some 
basic challenges in our electoral process. Some of the threats include viruses that can easily 
cause denial of service to the system, modifications to and deletion of the ballots data. Hackers 
can also take advantage of vulnerabilities that exist with the internet. Database and systems 
administrators who are in charge of the election hardware constituting the elections can also be 
security threat.  
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